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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO, )
) NO. 44298
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) ADA COUNTY NO. CR 2015-9083
v. )
)




STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Daxx E. Diaz was sentenced to a unified term of thirteen years, with eight years
fixed, for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs (“DUI”),
having two or more convictions within ten years, with a persistent violator enhancement.
He contends the district court abused its discretion when it imposed this sentence upon
him considering the mitigating factors that exist in this case—most significantly, the fact
that he had taken prescription medications prior to the offense, and did not engage in
driving behavior that posed any risk of danger to himself or others.
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Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
Mr. Diaz was charged by Information with felony DUI, misdemeanor driving
without privileges, and misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance (marijuana).
(R., pp.58-59.)  The State filed an Information Part II alleging Mr. Diaz is subject to a
persistent violator enhancement.  (R., pp.143-44, 151.)  Mr. Diaz pled guilty to the two
misdemeanor charges prior to trial, and proceeded to trial on the felony DUI charge.
(Tr., p.30, Ls.2-6, p.35, L.25 – p.36, L.5.)
Mr. Diaz testified that, on the morning of June 24, 2015, he was homeless, and
had spent the morning sleeping in his car.  (Tr., p.365, L.13 – p.366, L.12, p.385, Ls.10-
15.)  When he woke up, he took his medications—Lexapro1 and Balsalazide2—and
smoked marijuana.  (Tr., p.366, Ls.13-14, p.368, Ls.11-14.)  He took a shower at a
shelter, and then went to the library to work on his resume.  (Tr., p.366, L.21 – p.367,
L.6.)  He applied for employment at a number of restaurants, and was offered a
position.  (Tr., p.367, Ls.14-17, p.369, Ls.8-10.)  At some time before 2:00 p.m.,
Mr. Diaz took what he believed to be Buspar3 for  anxiety.   (Tr.,  p.384,  Ls.1-8.)   At
approximately 3:00 p.m., Mr. Diaz went to a friend’s house to have “a celebratory beer.”
(Tr., p.369, Ls.11-21.)  He drank less than two beers.  (Tr., p.380, L.5 – p.381, L.19.)
Mr. Diaz then drove from Boise to Meridian, when he hit something that jerked his wheel
1 Lexapro is a selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor (SSRI) used to treat depression and
anxiety. See Lexapro at https://www.drugs.com/lexapro.html (last visited March 30,
2017).
2 Balsalazide is a medication used to treat the pain and inflammation caused by active
ulcerative colitis. See Balsalazide at https://www.drugs.com/pro/balsalazide.html (last
visited March 30, 2017).
3 Buspar is an anti-anxiety medication used to treat symptoms of anxiety. See Buspar
at https://www.drugs.com/buspar.html (last visited March 30, 2017).
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to the right.  (Tr., p.370, Ls.8-21.)  He exited the highway at Eagle Road, and drove into
a subdivision to check his alignment.  (Tr., p.370, L.16 – p.371, L.14.)
An eyewitness observed Mr. Diaz driving erratically through the subdivision, and
called 911.  (R., p.80.)  The eyewitness followed Mr. Diaz’s vehicle, and Mr. Diaz came
to a stop on the grass alongside the roadway.  (Tr., p.373, Ls.1-18.)  Mr. Diaz testified
he handed over his keys to the eyewitness because he did not have a driver’s license
and did not want the police to become involved.  (Tr., p.372, Ls.17-20.)  A police officer
arrived on scene and Mr. Diaz told the officer his car was malfunctioning.  (R., p.80.)
Mr. Diaz failed a field sobriety test and was arrested on suspicion of DUI.  (R., p.81.)
His breath alcohol level was measured at .070 and .061 (deficient).  (R., p.81.)  Another
police officer conducted a drug recognition exam and concluded Mr. Diaz was under the
influence of cannabis, a central nervous system depressant, and alcohol.  (R., p.81.)
Following a two-day trial, a jury found Mr. Diaz guilty of DUI.  (R., p.200.)
Mr. Diaz admitted to having two prior convictions for DUI within ten years, and pled
guilty to being a persistent violator.  (Tr., p.462, Ls.19-24, p.464, Ls.11-14.)  Mr. Diaz
did not agree to participate in a presentence investigation, and a presentence
investigation report was not prepared prior to sentencing.  (Tr., p.464, Ls.17-22; 5/20/16
Tr., p.6, Ls.17-20.)
At sentencing, the State recommended a unified sentence of fifteen years, with
ten years fixed, and without a period of retained jurisdiction.  (5/20/16 Tr., p.6, L.24 –
p.7, L.7.)  Counsel for Mr. Diaz recommended a unified sentence of ten years, with two
years fixed, and with a period of retained jurisdiction.  (5/20/16 Tr., p.16, Ls.16-20.)  The
district court sentenced Mr. Diaz as follows:  for driving without privileges, 180 days in
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Ada County Jail; for misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance, one year in
Ada County Jail; for felony DUI with a persistent violator enhancement, a unified term of
thirteen years, with eight years fixed.  (5/20/16 Tr., p.31, Ls.1-20; R., pp.202-03.)  The
district court retained jurisdiction.  (5/20/16 Tr., p.31, Ls.21-22; R., p.204.)  The
judgment of conviction was entered on May 23, 2016, and Mr. Diaz filed a timely notice
of appeal on June 23, 2016.  (R., pp.203-07, 208-10.)
The district court held a rider review hearing on January 20, 2017.  The State
recommended relinquishment.  (1/20/17 Tr., p.13, Ls.5-10.)  Counsel for Mr. Diaz
recommended probation, stating Mr. Diaz “can be a success out there” and is “plenty
smart.”  (1/20/17 Tr., p.16, Ls.9-12.)  Mr. Diaz explained to the district court that he has
a history of controlled substance possession, but is not dangerous.  (1/20/17 Tr., p.17,
Ls.21-25.)  He pointed out he had no issues on his rider apart from “giving commissary
and doing pushups in the tier.”  (1/20/17 Tr., p.21, Ls.9-14.)  The district court
relinquished jurisdiction over Mr. Diaz, but sua sponte reduced the fixed portion of his
sentence from eight years to five years.  (1/20/17 Tr., p.24, L.21 – p.25, L.8.)
ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it sentenced Mr. Diaz to a unified term of
thirteen years, with eight years fixed, for felony DUI, which it later reduced to thirteen
years, with five years fixed?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Sentenced Mr. Diaz To A Unified Term
Of Thirteen Years, With Eight Years Fixed, For Felony DUI, Which It Later Reduced To
Thirteen Years, With Five Years Fixed
Mr. Diaz asserts that, given any view of the facts, the district court abused its
discretion when it sentenced him to a unified term of thirteen years, with eight years
fixed, for felony DUI, which it later reduced to thirteen years, with five years fixed.
Where, as here, the sentence imposed by the district court is within statutory limits, “the
appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion.”
State v. Williams, 151 Idaho 828, 834 (2011) (quoting State v. Windom, 150 Idaho 873,
875 (2011)).  “When a trial court exercises its discretion in sentencing, ‘the most
fundamental requirement is reasonableness.’” Id. (quoting State v. Hooper, 119 Idaho
606, 608 (1991)).  “A sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the
primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of
deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution.” Id. (citation omitted).  “When reviewing the
reasonableness of a sentence this Court will make an independent examination of the
record, ‘having regard to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender and the
protection of the public interest.’” Id. (quoting State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594
(1982)).
The sentence imposed upon Mr. Diaz by the district court was not reasonable
considering the nature of his offense, and was not necessary to protect the public
interest.  Mr. Diaz was arrested on suspicion of driving under the influence after he
drove very slowly through a subdivision in Meridian, and an eager eyewitness called
911 and demanded Mr. Diaz’s car keys.  (R., p.80; Tr. p.372, Ls.17-20.)  Mr. Diaz had
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taken prescription medications earlier in the day, and had consumed a small amount of
marijuana and less than two beers prior to driving.  (Tr., p.366, Ls.13-14, p.368, Ls.11-
14, p.380, L.5 – p.381, L.19, p.384, Ls.1-8.)  His driving behavior did not pose a risk of
danger to himself or others, and he was non-violent despite the aggressive intervention
of the eyewitness.  Mr. Diaz did pled not guilty to the offense because he believed, and
continues to believe, that he was not under the influence of any intoxicating substances
while driving.  (Tr., p.412, Ls.2-15; 5/20/16 Tr., p.25, L.24 – p.26, L.3.)  The
circumstances of the offense simply do not warrant the sentence imposed.
The sentence imposed upon Mr. Diaz was also not reasonable considering his
character.  Although only 39 years old at the time he committed the instant offense,
Mr. Diaz had been incarcerated for thirteen years.  (5/20/16 Tr., p.20. Ls.15-20.)
Despite this lengthy period of incarceration, Mr. Diaz attended culinary school and is
highly employable.  (5/20/16 Tr., p.19, Ls.9-11.)  In fact, he obtained employment the
very day he was arrested for DUI.  (Tr., p.367, Ls.14-17, p.369, Ls.8-10.)  Counsel for
Mr. Diaz told the district court that Mr. Diaz “has good potential” and “is clearly smart”
and “clearly motivated.”  (5/20/16 Tr., p.19, Ls.9-10, p.20, Ls.21-23.)  Counsel asked the
court not to “give up on Mr. Diaz” and argued that “warehousing him down at the
penitentiary is not warranted in this case.”  (5/20/16 Tr., p.21, Ls.9-12.)  Mr. Diaz told
the district court he was not guilty of driving under the influence and “was on medication
that the State told [him] to take.”  (5/20/16 Tr., p.25, L.24 – p.26, L.3.)
In light of the mitigating factors that exist in this case, and notwithstanding the
aggravating factors, the district court abused its discretion when it imposed upon
Mr. Diaz a unified sentence of thirteen years, with eight years fixed, for felony DUI,
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which it later reduced to thirteen years, with five years fixed.  This sentence was not
warranted by the nature of the offense Mr. Diaz committed or by his character, and is
not necessary to protect the public interest.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Diaz respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems
appropriate or remand this case to the district court for a new sentencing hearing.
DATED this 3rd day of April, 2017.
___________/s/______________
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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